I. INTRODUCTION

This nationwide Title VII class action challenges Wal-Mart’s employment policies and practices, which discriminate against female employees in the U.S. retail division. Although venue in this District is clearly proper for two of the named plaintiffs, Wal-Mart moves to dismiss or transfer the entire action on the grounds that venue is improper in the Northern District of California for some of the plaintiffs. Wal-Mart argues that the only proper venue for this case is the Western District of Arkansas, the location of its corporate headquarters.

Six current and former female employees seek to represent the class of all female employees who have worked or currently work for Wal-Mart retail stores. These women were selected as class representatives in part because they live and work in various regions of the country and in states with large concentrations of Wal-Mart stores. California has the second largest number of Wal-Mart stores in the nation. None of the named plaintiffs allege that they lived, worked or sought a promotion at a Wal-Mart store in Arkansas. See Declaration of Brad Seligman in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition (“Seligman Decl.”) at ¶ 4.

There is no dispute that the two California named plaintiffs – Betty Dukes and Patricia Surgeson – satisfy the venue requirements of Title VII’s special venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), for this judicial district. [1] Wal-Mart’s argument instead rests on the proposition that venue is proper only if every named plaintiff in a Title VII class action individually satisfies venue. While Wal-Mart claims that this proposition – the lynchpin of its entire venue argument -- is “settled law” (Def. MPA at 1:22), it cannot cite a single case that directly addresses this issue, much less adopts such a rule. Instead, Wal-Mart relies on general case authority under various federal venue statutes, which holds that, in a class action, the district court should look to the named plaintiffs rather than the class members to determine if venue is satisfied. These cases do not reach the more specific question raised by this motion – must every plaintiff meet venue requirements under Title VII.

A long line of case authority under analogous federal venue provisions has, in fact, reached the opposite conclusion – venue is satisfied if met by one named plaintiff. Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 588 F.2d 895, 898-99 (3^d Cir. 1978). This common-sense view is, moreover, consistent with the intent of the Title VII venue provision, which was to provide plaintiffs with wide latitude to select an appropriate forum in which to prosecute their civil rights claims.

Wal-Mart’s interpretation of Title VII’s venue provision – never adopted by any court -- would effectively turn the statute on its head, giving defendants the ability to use the default venue provision as a weapon to force multi-state and nationwide claims to their principal place of business, or force plaintiffs to file multiple regional suits. There is nothing in the language of the statute, its history nor subsequent case law that would support this application of Title VII. Wal-Mart’s approach also makes little sense as a matter of judicial economy, inevitably leading to more procedural complexity and duplicative litigation or less diverse class representation. Finally, there is no support for the extreme remedy sought by Wal-Mart -- the dismissal or transfer of all claims in this case, including those it concedes are properly before this court.

II. THE LAWSUIT

This nationwide class action suit alleges that Wal-Mart Stores, the largest private employer in the United States, discriminates against its female employees in promotions, compensation, training and job assignments. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 2. The First Amended Complaint alleges that Wal-Mart employs uniform employment and personnel policies throughout the United States. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 20. As a result of these policies and practices, female employees are largely relegated to lower paying jobs and systematically denied advancement opportunities. Despite the fact that women comprise over 72% of the Wal-Mart hourly workforce, they hold fewer than 10% of the Wal-Mart store manager positions. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 23, 26. These statistical disparities are not geographically isolated but, instead, are present throughout the Wal-Mart stores across the country. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 27.

The named plaintiffs are current and former employees who each have experienced the real-world consequences of these unlawful practices. Plaintiff Betty Dukes currently works for a Wal-Mart store in Pittsburg, California, where she has been discriminatorily denied equal advancement opportunities. First Amended Complaint, ¶ 29. Plaintiff Patricia Surgeson was employed in Wal-Mart’s Vacaville, California store where she was subjected to discriminatory pay and working conditions. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 60-67. Plaintiff Kimberly Miller spent nine years working for Wal-Mart stores in Florida, where she was repeatedly passed over for promotion in favor of less qualified men, and where she was expected to tolerate a sexually hostile work environment. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 68 –83. Plaintiff Sandra Stevenson, an Illinois resident, worked in the Gurnee, Illinois Sam’s Club where she watched male employees, one of whom she had trained, receive training and promotional opportunities that she was denied. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 52-59. Plaintiff Micki Earwood, who worked in four different Wal-Mart stores in Ohio, was refused promotion because she was unwilling to relocate, a condition not imposed on male applicants for promotion. First Amended Complaint, ¶ ¶ 84-92. Plaintiff Stephanie Odle, a Texas resident, worked in eight different Sam’s Club stores in three states, where she was discriminatorily denied promotion and subjected to retaliation. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 41- 51.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Title VII’s Venue Provision Affords Plaintiffs Broad Latitude in Choosing a Forum

The parties agree that Title VII’s special venue provision applies to the venue determination in this action. Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 950 F.2d 586, 587-88 (9^th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he later, specific venue provision (section 2000e-5(f)(3)) . . . applies rather than the earlier, general venue provision (section 1391(b))”). This provision allows for three alternative methods of establishing venue, with a default forum to use in the “rare case” when venue cannot be found in the other three districts. Arrocha v. The Panama Canal Comm’n, 609 F.Supp. 231, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting legislative history of provision).

The statute provides in relevant part:

[A]n action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Congress intended to provide civil rights plaintiffs with very broad latitude in selecting a forum. “[T]his broad provision for alternative forums was necessary to support the desire of Congress to afford citizens full and easy redress of civil rights grievances.” Passantino v. Johnson and Johnson Consumer Products, 212 F.3d 493, 504 (9^th Cir. 2000), (quoting Richardson v. Alabama State Board of Education, 935 F.2d 1240, 1248 (11^th Cir. 1991)). “To facilitate the redress of Civil Rights deprivations, Congress favored Title VII plaintiffs with a wide and unfettered discretion in choosing a forum. . . .” Ashworth v. Eastern Airlines, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6179 (E.D. Va. 1974). This approach was both necessary and appropriate given the hostile reception that civil rights litigants could expect to receive in “company towns” dominated by an employer’s headquarters.

The venue provision was one component of the overall statutory scheme that was intended to encourage and facilitate private enforcement. As the Supreme Court noted in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 390 U.S. 400 (1968):

When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law.

Id. at 401 (interpreting attorneys’ fees provision).

Courts have interpreted the Title VII venue provision in light of that Congressional intent. Interpreting the first option under the venue provision, the district court, in Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Va. 1972), observed:

it does not seem inconsistent with Congress’ militant approach to affording citizens full redress of civil rights grievances to allow plaintiffs a particularly wide latitude in choosing the situs of their litigation. Such latitude affords greater convenience to plaintiffs and enables them to avoid potential local economic and political pressures which might be believed to serve to hinder a trial judge’s efforts to maintain an unfettered, impartial atmosphere.

Id. at 1060.

The Gilbert court underscored that the far-reaching venue provision was particularly appropriate for class actions under Title VII:

The broad latitude given by the statute is particularly engaging when taken in conjunction with class actions. Such actions, which are particularly appropriate and plentiful under Title VII, are often of interstate or intrastate character, stretching in geographical impact beyond the limits of particular divisions or state districts.

Id.

While defendants often complain that Title VII’s venue provision invites “forum shopping,” this is “apparently what Congress intended.” Ashworth v. Eastern Airlines, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6179 at * 5 (E.D. Va. 1974). In rejecting this common forum-shopping argument, the Ninth Circuit has observed:

It is of more concern that national companies with distant offices might try to force plaintiffs to litigate far away from their homes. . . . Forcing the plaintiff to litigate in a federal court on the other side of the country would significantly increase the plaintiffs’ cost of prosecuting her action.

Passantino, 212 F.3d at 505 (interpreting the first prong of the venue provision for a failure to promote claim).

Against this backdrop, it is plain that Wal-Mart’s interpretation of the special venue provision does not withstand scrutiny.

B. The Case Authority Cited by Wal-Mart Does Not Address the Issue Presented by this Motion

While Wal-Mart contends its interpretation of the Title VII venue provision is “settled law,” it cites no case supporting its view. Rather, the cases cited to support its position (Defs. MPA at 5) address the limited issue of whether, in a class action, unnamed class members must each satisfy venue requirements under various federal venue statutes. These cases have uniformly held that the court should look to the named plaintiffs (or named defendants), not to the absent class members, to determine if venue exists. These cases do not address whether each named plaintiff must individually satisfy venue.

For example, in United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc. , 72 F.R.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976), the only Title VII case cited by Wal-Mart on this point, the government brought a defendant class action against the trucking industry for race and national origin discrimination. Two trucking companies, which were not among the seven named representatives of the defendant class, sought dismissal because they had not been personally served and the venue requirement was not met for them. The district court denied the motion, concluding that venue need not be satisfied for absent class members, only named representatives. Id. at 100.

The other cases cited by Wal-Mart reach the same limited result under other federal venue statutes. United States v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2^d Cir. 1974) (applying venue provision for habeus corpus claims, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d), for class action challenging sentences for youthful offenders); Munson v. Eli Lilly, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11040 (D. Minn. 1987)(holding that, in products liability class action based on diversity, venue determined under former 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) where “all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside”); Dunn v. Sullivan, 758 F. Supp. 210, 216 (D. Del. 1991)(noting that, in class action for SSI recipients, defendant abandoned appeal of venue); Bywaters v. United States, 196 F.R.D. 458, 463 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (applying special venue provision of the Little Tucker Act which limits venue to “only . . . the judicial district where the plaintiff resides”) .

Significantly, defendants in these cases sought to use venue rules to limit the geographic scope and size of class actions. In each circumstance, the courts rejected these challenges, determining that venue for the named plaintiffs was sufficient and allowed the class actions to proceed. As the court noted in Trucking Employers, “[t]o hold otherwise would effectively eviscerate the historic function of the class suit and render Rule 23 largely useless.” 72 F.R.D. at 100. Thus, Wal-Mart’s novel interpretation of Title VII’s venue provision is not supported by the rationale behind the cases upon which it relies.

C. Following Analogous Federal Case Law, Only One Named Plaintiff Must Meet the Special Venue Requirements of Title VII

Plaintiffs have not found a case under Title VII that directly addresses the issue presented by this motion. This issue has, however, been addressed under other analogous federal venue provisions, where courts have consistently concluded that venue need only be satisfied by one plaintiff. There is no reason that these venue rules should not apply equally to Title VII’s venue provision.

For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) governs venue in claims filed against federal agencies or federal officers and, like the Title VII venue provision, affords plaintiffs four different methods in which venue may be satisfied. [2] In Exxon Corp v. Federal Trade Commission, 588 F.2d 895 (3^rd Cir. 1978), a multi-plaintiff declaratory relief action against the FTC, the Third Circuit rejected the notion that every plaintiff must satisfy venue:

[R]equiring every plaintiff in an action against the federal government or an agent thereof to independently meet section 1391(e)’s standards would result in an unnecessary multiplicity of litigation. The language of the statute itself mandates no such narrow construction. There is no requirement that all plaintiffs reside in the forum district.

588 F.2d at 898-99. The Exxon decision was consistent with several earlier district court opinions. In Kenyatta v. Kelley, 430 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1977), a civil rights class action challenging FBI practices, the district court held that “[t]he requirement of [Section 1391(e)] that ‘the’ plaintiffs reside in the forum district does not require that all plaintiffs reside there.” Id. at 1330 n. 7 (emphasis in original). Numerous federal courts, including this district, have adopted this interpretation of Section 1391(e). Minn-Dak Farmers Coop. v. Espy, 851 F.Supp. 1423, 1425 (D. N.D. 1994); National Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n. v. Burnley, 700 F.Supp. 1043, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Mir v. Civiletti, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18607 (D. Kan. 1981); Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F.Supp. 1, 3, n.3 (D.D.C. 1987); Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544, 552 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other gds sub nom Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Candarini v. Attorney Gen., 369 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).

Courts have reached similar conclusions under other special venue provisions. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), permits nationwide class actions to challenge the interpretation and administration of Social Security benefit regulations. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701 (1979). “[O]nce the court finds any appropriate named plaintiff, Rule 23 imposes no geographic bounds on the extent of the class.” Holman v. Califano, 83 F.R.D. 488 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996) , rev’d on other gds, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), defendant argued that venue was improper under the federal Privacy Act, which includes its own special venue provision, because two of the individual plaintiffs did not satisfy venue. The defendant claimed that the Exxon rule should not apply because the language of the special venue provision of the Privacy Act was arguably narrower than Section 1391(e)’s venue provision. Judge Tashima dismissed the argument as “miss[ing] the point” and adopted the reasoning of Exxon for the special venue provision: “[I]f any plaintiff satisfies the venue requirement of [the Privacy Act], the venue requirement is satisfied as to the remaining plaintiffs.” Id. at 1467.

There is no reason not to apply this same reasoning to Title VII’s special venue provision.

By its terms, the statute creates three alternative means of establishing venue and relegates the employer’s headquarters to the forum of last resort. This statutory language gives civil rights plaintiffs broad control in selecting a forum. Nothing in the language of the statute suggests the need to restrict venue as Wal-Mart proposes, nor has defendant pointed to any such language. See Exxon, 588 F.2d at 898-99. The case law provides no more solace to Wal-Mart than does the statutory language and legislative history. There is no case authority supporting Wal-Mart’s proposed interpretation and many federal courts have reached the opposite result. [3]

Were Wal-Mart’s argument correct, all nationwide Title VII class actions, and even individual actions involving two plaintiffs from different states, would have to be filed in the judicial district where the defendant has its principal place of business. This is plainly not what Congress intended. The defendant’s “principal office” is not simply one of four available methods for venue under Title VII. Instead, it is the “default provision” of Title VII, to be used only in the “rare case” when respondent is not found within any of the other districts. Arrocha, 609 F. Supp. at 234.

This case aptly illustrates why Congress gave such broad latitude to plaintiffs in selecting venue. It would work serious unfairness to require the plaintiffs to litigate this case in Wal-Mart’s home district, where none of them has worked, or currently lives. While Wal-Mart’s formidable economic power is now felt throughout the world, there is nowhere that its economic prowess is more clearly manifest than in Arkansas, the site of its corporate headquarters. Wal-Mart is the largest corporation in Arkansas, employing over 39,000 employees in that state alone. Seligman Declaration, ¶¶ 2 - 3. According to Wal-Mart’s own website, it spent $3.4 billion with Arkansas-based suppliers in 2000. Id. at ¶ 2. Wal-Mart paid more than $113 million in state and local taxes and collected $229 million in sales taxes for the state. Id. If plaintiffs were required to litigate this action in Arkansas, they would face the kind of “local economic and political pressures” that the venue provision was intended to prevent. Gilbert, 347 F. Supp. at 1060.

Moreover, Wal-Mart’s approach risks undermining the efficiency offered by class litigation and could lead to a multiplicity of actions. Should plaintiffs with nationwide claims choose not to pursue such a case in the defendant’s home district, they would be faced with the prospect of filing a series of regional or state-wide cases with local plaintiffs. Although each case would allege precisely the same discriminatory pattern and practice, the plaintiffs and the courts would be forced to bear the inefficiencies of litigating in multiple forums. Even with multi-district coordination for pre-trial purposes, the complexity and expense would be enormous. Plaintiffs in this case already face the prospect of litigating against the most economically powerful retail corporation in the world. That economic imbalance would only be exacerbated by the necessity of fighting the same battles on multiple fronts. This is precisely the “multiplicity of litigation” that the Exxon rule is intended to avoid.

Finally, while Wal-Mart’s approach does not preclude the pursuit of a nationwide claim in a forum other than the defendant’s home district, it does undermine efforts to offer a geographically diverse set of named plaintiffs in a nationwide or regional case. Where the class is nationwide in scope, such geographic diversity insures a heightened level of class representation. Indeed, since even defendant concedes that class members need not meet venue requirements, and all named plaintiffs in this case are members of the class they seek to represent, defendant’s motion is ultimately a hyper-technical attempt to eliminate geographic diversity of the class representatives even where the class is diverse. A court could nevertheless conclude that it is in the best interests of the class to have geographically diverse representatives. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3) and the Advisory Committee Note to the 1967 Amendment (“Subdivision (d)(3) reflects the possibility of conditioning the maintenance of a class action, e.g., on the strengthening of the representation. . . .”).

D. Where At Least One Plaintiff Has Venue, Dismissal or Transfer is an Inappropriate Remedy

Even if the Court were to conclude that venue was improper for the non-California plaintiffs, the extreme measure of dismissal or transfer of the entire case is wholly unwarranted, especially where Wal-Mart concedes that venue for the California plaintiffs is proper here. Indeed, Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that “misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action.” Cf. Anrig v. Ringsby United, 603 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (9^th Cir. 1978) (Rule 21 applies to venue challenges); Schwarzer et al, Cal. Prac. Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 7.161 (The Rutter Group 2001).[4]

IV. CONCLUSION

Wal-Mart has not cited a single case that would require this Court to dismiss or transfer this action for improper venue. Nor has Wal-Mart provided the Court with any policy reason why it should adopt an interpretation of the Title VII venue provision, which is inconsistent with Congressional intent and with federal venue law. Transfer or dismissal would serve no purpose other than to delay this action and to force the named plaintiffs into an alien forum that they do not seek. Wal-Mart’s motion should, therefore, be denied.

Dated:

Respectfully submitted,

By: _______________________________

BRAD SELIGMAN (SBN 083838)

JOCELYN D. LARKIN (SBN 110817)

THE IMPACT FUND

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 1

II. THE LAWSUIT..................................................................................................................... 2

III. ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................... 3

A. Title VII’s Venue Provision Affords Plaintiffs Broad Latitude in Choosing a

Forum............................................................................................................................. 3

B. The Case Authority Cited by Wal-Mart Does Not Address the Issue Presented

by this Motion................................................................................................................. 5

C. Following Analogous Federal Case Law, Only One Named Plaintiff Must Meet the Special Venue Requirements of Title VII................................................................................................. 7

D. Where At Least One Plaintiff Has Venue, Dismissal or Transfer is an Inappropriate Remedy 11

IV. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Anrig v. Ringsby United, 603 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1978) .............................................................. 12

Arrocha v. The Panama Canal Commission, 609 F. Supp. 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ................... 4, 10

Ashworth v. Eastern Airlines, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6179 (E.D. Va. 1974) ............................. 5, 6

Beckmann v. CBS, 192 F.R.D. 608 (D. Minn. 2000) ..................................................................... 10

Bywaters v. United States, 196 F.R.D. 458 (E.D. Tex. 2000) ......................................................... 7

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979). .................................................................................. 9

Candarini v. Attorney General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ............................................ 9

Dunn v. Sullivan, 758 F. Supp. 210 (D. Del. 1991) ......................................................................... 7

Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 588 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1978) .......................... 3, 8, 10

Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996) , revd on other gds, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) ......................................................................................... 9

Gilbert v. General Electric Co, 347 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Va. 1972) .................................... 2, 5, 11

Haynes v. Shoneys Inc., 1992 WL 752127 (N.D.Fla. June 22, 1992)............................................. 10

Holman v. Califano, 83 F.R.D. 488 (M.D. Pa. 1979) ..................................................................... 9

Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.), revd on other gds sub nom, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) ................................................................................................................. 9

Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1987) ........................................... 9

Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 950 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1991) ............................. 4

Kenyatta v. Kelley, 430 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1977) .................................................................. 8

Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative v. Espy, 851 F. Supp. 1423 (D. N.D. 1994) ............................... 9

Mir v. Civiletti, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18607 (D. Kan. 1981) ....................................................... 9

Munson v. Eli Lilly, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11040 (D. Minn. 1987) ............................................... 7

National Air Traffic Controllers Association v. Burnley,700 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ...... 9

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) .................................................... 5

Passantino v. Johnson and Johnson Consumer Products, 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000), .......... 5, 6

United States v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974) ................................................................. 7

United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc. 72 F.R.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976) ....................................... 7

STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) ........................................................................................................................ 8

Fed. R. Civ. P. 21........................................................................................................................... 12

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3) ................................................................................................................. 12

The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) .................................................................................... 9

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) ........................................................................................................... 2, 5

SECONDARY SOURCES

Cal. Prac. Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 7.161 (The Rutter Group 2001) ............... 12

[1] Wal-Mart concedes that venue is proper in this district for Dukes’ claim. Named plaintiff Patricia Surgeson, who worked at defendant’s Vacaville store, also has venue for her claims in this district because she may bring an action “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); see Gilbert v. General Elec. Co, 347 F.Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Va. 1972).

[2] Section 1391(e) provides in relevant part:

A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.

[3] Other nationwide class actions have been litigated under Title VII in courts other than the defendant’s home district. See, e.g., Beckmann v. CBS, 192 F.R.D. 608 (D. Minn. 2000) (nationwide gender class action with named plaintiffs in three states); Haynes v. Shoney’s Inc., 1992 WL 752127 (N.D. Fla. June 22, 1992) (Title VII multi-state race discrimination class action litigated in Florida against company headquartered in Nashville).

[4] This Court has authority under Rule 21 to add or drop parties to preserve venue. Anrig v. Ringsby United, 603 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (9^th Cir. 1978). The Court may do so on “its own initiative at any stage of an action. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Defendant.